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DRAFT AIRGRAM

TO: ALL ARA DIPLOMATIC POSTS, POLAD CINCLANT, CINSICO,
USUN NEW YORK, COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS-MIAMI,
USRO-PARIS.

SUBJECT: Implications of Cuba's Renewed Campaign of
Incitation to Violent Revolution in Latin America.

During the past four months the Castro regime has progressively increased the patch and volume of its campaign to incite violent revolution in Latin America after a period of relative quiescence. This is reflected in the output of Radio Habana as well as in statements by Fidel Castro and "Che" Guevara's article on revolutionary methods for Latin America in the September issue of Cuba Socialista.

There is good reason to believe that following his return from Moscow, and under prodding from the USSR, Castro sought a relaxation of tensions with the US in order to give him a badly needed breathing spell which would permit an all-out attempt to consolidate the regime. Castro may even have thought that he could look forward to such relaxation. Several factors seem to have contributed to this expectation:

(1) our willingness to meet his terms on the ransoming of the Bay of Pigs prisoners and the spirit in which the operation was carried through; (2) our firm public stand against use of U.S. territory by Cuban exiles for hit-and-run raids

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against Cuba, coincidentally one of his five conditions for Cuban acceptance of inspection made at the time of the missile crisis and subsequently converted into terms for improvement of relations; (3) an illusion of Cuba's firm status within the communist bloc arising from attentions given him during his trip to the Soviet Union; and (4) the modest lessening of East-West tensions resulting from the negotiation of the test ban treaty.

Castro's hope for a breathing spell was shattered when we instituted the Cuban Assets Control Regulations on July 9, 1963 and the President, in his July 17, 1963 press conference made very clear that we do not accept the existence and cannot coexist in a peaceful sense with Cuba as long as it remains a Soviet satellite. He correctly interpreted these developments as meaning that the U.S. had not altered its policy of strong opposition to his regime. His immediate reaction was to retaliate with an attempt to take over the U.S. Embassy building in Habana which backfired when the Swiss refused to leave unless forced to do so. In his July 26 speech, Castro resumed his sharp attacks on the U.S. and renewed the call for violent revolution in Latin America.

Realization

Realization by Castro that he could not expect any respite from the U.S. coincided with a series of other trends and developments adding to his discomfort at home and abroad:

(1) growing economic difficulties at home leading to further belt tightening, greater regimentation and public dissatisfaction.

(2) increasing counter-revolutionary activity demonstrated by reports of internal sabotage and exile raids.

(3) worsening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, with Soviets pushing Cuba to support their position and Castro resisting further identification with Moscow.

(4) growing sense of political and economic isolation from the West and alienation within the Soviet bloc because of his maverick behavior.

To complicate the position of the regime further, the devastation caused by hurricane Flora virtually rules out any possibilities of achieving gains on the economic front in the near future. It will increase the economic burden to the Soviet bloc already chafing over what it must contribute to keep Castro afloat. The economic stringencies

caused

caused by Flora cannot help but produce greater unrest in Cuba over time and thereby create a more propitious atmosphere for an increase in oppositionist activities.

The dynamics of the Cuban revolutionary require it to maintain its momentum through victories at home or abroad. As Castro's domestic difficulties mount, we expect him increasingly to look for ways of scoring victories elsewhere in the hemisphere. This is why he is fanning the fires of violence in Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Peru, countries where he considers conditions to be propitious. It is likely that in the months ahead he will attempt to step up his subversive activities in an effort at least to give the appearance of support for his position abroad and at most to bring about a Castro-type government in another Latin American country and thereby break out of his isolation and buttress his regime.

Another important consideration in this equation is Castro's instinct to retaliate when he considers that specific action has been taken against him. He is currently placing responsibility on the United States for increased counter-revolutionary activity in the island. The area of retaliation against U.S. assets within Cuba has been narrowed to the point where there is little left for him to seize except the Embassy

and the Guantanamo Naval Base. The Swiss have blocked him on the first, and he is not likely to attempt the second because he is aware of the grave consequences for him. He must look elsewhere for targets. U.S. Government property and American private industrial and commercial establishments in Latin America are logical and likely objects to attack. To prepare for this contingency the Department considers it a matter of primary importance that the Embassies examine carefully their existing plans for dealing with this type of activity.

Those portions of their E & E plans dealing with "stand-fast" situations should be reviewed, particularly Annex K (Internal Defense). While it is recognized that most posts have plans in the prescribed format, and have prepared Annexes K, some posts might find it necessary and/or desirable to elaborate upon that section of their plan based on the real possibility of Castro-Communist inspired terrorism as described above. In addition, posts should develop plans, to be put into effect when circumstances make such measures clearly necessary, for instituting special security measures prior to such time as the internal defense section of the

E & E plan would be implemented. These might include strict visitor and package controls around-the-clock, in office, duty officer systems (at those posts where there are no Marine Guards); local policy protection; and a program of reduction and centralization of classified document holdings. So as not to cause alarm in the American community and in the local scene in general, the Embassies will want to move very cautiously in putting any of these measures into effect waiting for conditions clearly to warrant such action.

The problem of arranging effective protection for private American industrial and commercial establishments is extremely difficult because of the necessary reliance on local law enforcement and military organizations. Most posts maintain continuing liaison with local authorities especially where there are Regional Security Officers or AID public safety advisors. These contacts should be exploited to the fullest to ensure prompt action on the part of local authorities if private American installations should become the targets of terroristic activities. "Citizens Committees" (cf EE I 216) have proven highly effective both for keeping the private American

American community informed of growing emergency situations (thereby affording the private citizen members the opportunity to take precautionary measures) and also of obtaining their cooperation which in some cases involves the use of resources not normally available to the U.S. Government, such as in-country communications systems, company-owned transportation, etc. Embassies should bear in mind in considering implementation of these measures, the same reservations contained in the previous paragraph. The Department wishes the Embassies to be forehanded in preparing to meet anticipated difficulties, but, at the same time, desires them to avoid premature action which might cause a counter-productive sense of alarm.

Finally, the Department would welcome comments from any of the addressees posts regarding additional measures which might be taken to counter the threat described in this circular.

ARA:WGBowdler/JPMcDonnell:dr 11/12/63